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REGARDING FURTHER ADMISSION 
OF EVIDENCE OF THE 
DURKIN HOMICIDE 
Plaintiff seeks to admit evidence of the Durkin homicide beyond what has already been 
offered for two purposes: primarily, Plaintiff contends that there are sufficient similarities between 
the Durkin and Sheppard homicides to cause the Durkin homicide to be admissible as proof of 
Richard Eberling' s identity as the killer of Mrs. Sheppard. For the reasons set forth below, the State 
of Oho's motion in limine to limit further evidence of the Durkin homicide is GRANTED. 
Evidence of the Durkin Homicide as Proof of Eberling's 
"Identity" as the Sheppard Killer1 
After consideration of Plaintiffs detailed proffer, the Court is not persuaded that the Durkin 
homicide is admissible as proof of "identity" (commonly known as "modus operandi") under R. 
Evid. 404(B). The similarities between the two homicides are not sufficiently distinctive to cause 
me to admit this evidence under rule 404(b). State v. Bey, 85 Oh. St. 3d 487; State v. Lowe, 69 Oh. 
St. 3d 527. In the end, the Durkin homicide, while it may show that Eberling is the type of person 
1 The Court previously announced this aspect of its opinion from the bench. 
1 
who would kill Ms. Sheppard, does not show that Eberling is the person who killed Ms. Sheppard. 
This is the distinction which the Lowe case makes between that which is and which is not admissible 
under rule 404(b ). 
Evidence of Eberling's Statements to Ms. Scheidler Concerning the Durkin Homicide2 
This leads to the closer question of Plaintiffs alternative argument, that evidence of 
Eberling's conversation with Ms. Scheidler, in which he admitted killing Ms. Durkin, should be 
admitted as an "other act" of Eberling to show that, when drinking and making admissions 
concerning the commission of a homicide (or any other serious crime for that matter), Eberling has 
been truthful in the past. Plaintiff contends that this is probative of whether Eberling was truthful 
when he confessed to Dyal under similar circumstances. Plaintiff contends that this is a non-
character use of evidence ofEberling's other acts. Plaintiff contends that this evidence shows the 
absence of fabrication on the part of Eberling which plaintiff contends would be a non-character use 
akin to "the absence of mistake" or "identity" explicitly recognized under rule 404(b ). 
The starting point for analyzing Plaintiffs argument is Evid. R. 806, which provides that a 
hearsay declarant's credibility may be supported or attacked as ifthe declarant were testifying from 
the witness stand in the case sub Judice. Thus, the issue becomes whether, if Eberling had appeared 
in court and testified that he killed Marilyn Sheppard, his statement to Scheidler could be admitted 
for the limited purpose of supporting his credibility. Evid. R. 404(A)(3) states that a witness' 
character for credibility should be evaluated pursuant to Rules 607, 608 and 609. Here, because the 
issue is one of specific instances of conduct affecting credibility, Rule 608 is operative. 
2 The Court previously advised all counsel informally of this ruling; the within 
Memorandum Opinion places this ruling on the record. 
2 
A witness' credibility may not be supported unless and until it has been attacked. Evid. R. 
608(A). 3 Under Evid. R. 608(B), prior instances of truthfulness offered to support a witness' 
truthful character must be "clearly probative of truthfulness." The circumstances of Eberling's 
confession to Scheidler are not clearly probative of a truthful character. Scheidler was an accomplice 
in the fraudulent scheme. As an accomplice, Eberling had reason to believe that Scheidler would 
not disclose his statements to anyone. Accordingly, the fact that he would speak freely and truthfully 
to an accomplice does not mean he is necessarily of truthful character. Second, Ms. Scheidler' s 
status as an accomplice aside, the circumstances of having truthfully confessed to murder on one 
occasion when speaking with a young woman over drinks, as is the case with Eberling's comments 
to Scheidler, does not clearly tend to show that he is a person of truthful character. 
Because this is an issue of specific instances of conduct affecting a witness' credibility, the 
Court looks to rule 608(B) and not to Rule 404(B). In essence, Plaintiffs argument, while couched 
in terms of Rule 404(B)'s "absence of mistake" or "identity" necessarily boils down to a question 
of whether Eberling' s honest confession about the Durkin homicide is probative of his honesty when 
confessing to the Sheppard homicide. Accordingly, Rule 608(B) is the controlling rule of evidence. 
3 The Court notes that the State of Ohio, which would be most likely to attack Eberling' s 
credibility, has done so to a very limited extent. There were some questions put to the witness Dyal 
about Eberling's prior thefts. Neither party has requested that the jury be allowed to consider the 
Eberling murder conviction in weighing his credibility as a hearsay declarant -- the State of Ohio has 
only sought to have the murder conviction considered for the much narrower purpose of explaining 
Dyal's timing in reporting Eberling's statements to the police. The State's main attack has been on 
the witness Dyal' s credibility as the person who has related Eberling' s hearsay statement to the jury 
- the State has not chosen to focus its attack on Eberling, the purported hearsay declarant. 
Because there has been some attack on Eberling's credibility, the Court will address whether 
Plaintiffs proffered evidence is an appropriate attempt to support Eberling's credibility. 
3 
Even if the Court were to evaluate this matter under a Rule 404(B) analysis, there is nothing 
so distinctive about these conversations to tend to say that, as a matter of identity, proof of one 
truthful statement shows proof that the other is truthful. Similarly, the Court is not persuaded that 
proof of one truthful statement shows the absence of fabrication on the other occasion, or to say that 
proof of one truthful statement establishes a pattern of truthfulness. The fact that Eberling has 
truthfully admitted to killing Ms. Durkin in a discussion over drinks with his younger female 
accomplice Ms. Scheidler does not mean that he was truthful when he told his younger female friend 
Ms. Dyal that he killed Ms. Sheppard. Moreover, the lapse in time between the time of the murder 
and the time of the confession is dissimilar between the confession to Scheidler, which was to a 
relatively recent murder, and the alleged confession to Dyal, which was to a murder long since 
committed. 
For the foregoing reasons, the motion in limine is 
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